State of Utah v. Michael Von Ferguson : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Michael Von Ferguson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Debra M. Nelson; Vernice S. Trease; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Counsel for Appellee.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; B.
Kent Morgan; Alicia H. Cook; Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorneys; Counsel for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Ferguson, No. 20040077 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4777
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P] aintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON, 
Defendant/'Appellee. 
Case No. 20040077-CA 








DEBRA M. NELSON 
VERNICE S. TREASE 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 400"South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellee 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
B. KENT MORGAN 
ALICIA H. COOK 
Deputy Salt Lake County District 
Attorneys 
Counsel for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 1 5 2004 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040077-CA 
REPLY BRIEF 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
VERNICE S. TREASE 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
B. KENT MORGAN 
ALICIA H. COOK 
Deputy Salt Lake County District 
Attorneys 
Counsel for Appellee Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II 
THE REMEDY FOR A MISDEMEANOR DEFENDANT DEPRIVED OF 
COUNSEL IS VACATION OF ANY JAIL TIME, LEAVING THE 
BALANCE OF HIS SENTENCE IN PLACE AND HIS CONVICTION 
AVAILABLE TO ENHANCE FUTURE OFFENSES 1 
A. The relief granted by the Court in Shelton is incompatible with 
defendant's theory that Shelton's conviction is invalid 1 
B. Defendant's prior conviction is just as reliable as it would have been had no 
jail time been imposed 3 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION IS ENTITLED TO THE 
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, WHICH DEFENDANT DID NOT 
REBUT 4 
A. Defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
regularity even if the prior judgment shows he appeared pro se 4 
B. Defendant did not rebut the presumption of regularity 6 
CONCLUSION 11 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) 1, 2, 3 
Burgettv. Texas, 389 U.S. 109(1967).] 5,8 
Nicholsv. UnitedStates, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) 2,3 
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) 4, 8, 9 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) 3 
Woodfordv. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2003) 5 
STATE CASES 
Exparte Lereed Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96, 102 (2000) 1, 2 
In re Smith, 925 P.2d 169 (Utah 1996) 10 
State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App. 95, 68 P.3d 1035 6, 7,10 
State v. Triptow, 110 P.2d 146 (1989) 5, 7 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 




REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II. 
THE REMEDY FOR A MISDEMEANOR DEFENDANT DEPRIVED 
OF COUNSEL IS VACATION OF ANY JAIL TIME, LEAVING THE 
BALANCE OF HIS SENTENCE IN PLACE AND HIS CONVICTION 
AVAILABLE TO ENHANCE FUTURE OFFENSES 
A. The relief granted by the Court in Shelton is incompatible with 
defendant's theory that Shelton's conviction is invalid. 
In Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), the Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at 674. The Alabama court had "affirm[ed] 
Shelton's conviction but reverse[d] that aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of 
suspended jail time." Ex parte Lereed Shelton, 851 So.2d 96, 102 (2000). Thus, the 
Supreme Court affirmed Shelton's conviction and sentence except the suspended jail time. 
Seeking to distinguish Shelton, defendant contends that the Supreme Court's 
affirmance of Shelton's conviction lacks precedential significance because "Alabama only 
sought review of the Alabama Supreme Court's invalidation of the defendant's suspended 
sentence but did not challenge the state court's affirmation of defendant's conviction." Br. 
Aple. at 25. Defendant further asserts that "the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shelton and 
prior case law show that a misdemeanor conviction taken in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment is invalid." Br. Aple. at 26. 
The relief granted in Shelton demonstrates that the Supreme Court did not affirm 
Shelton's conviction merely because it had not been challenged. By affirming the Alabama 
court, the Supreme Court affirmed not only Shelton's conviction, but an assessment of court 
costs, a fine of $500, reparations of $25, and a restitution award of $516.69. Id. at 658 
(specifying the components of the sentence), 674 (affirming Alabama court); Ex Parte 
Shelton, 851 So.2d at 102 (affirming all components of the sentence except suspended jail 
time). In fact, the Court did not even vacate his term of probation, expressly leaving to the 
Alabama court the question of whether, despite the invalidation of Shelton's suspended 
sentence, his probation term could be "freestanding and independently effective." Shelton, 
535 U.S. at 674. Obviously, the Supreme Court could not have ordered this relief had 
Shelton's conviction been invalidated. 
Shelton was deprived of his right to counsel, yet his conviction remained valid to 
support all aspects of his sentence except the suspended jail term. Such a conviction is thus 
necessarily "also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction." 
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 749 (1994). 
2 
B. Defendant's prior conviction is just as reliable as it would have 
been had no jail time been imposed. 
Defendant complains that "his prior conviction cannot be 'credited as reliable' absent 
a showing that he waived his right to 'the guiding hand of counsel.'" Br. Aple. at 27 (quoting 
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 665, in turn quoting Argersinger v. Hamilton, 407 U.S. 25,40 (1972)). 
On the contrary, any implication that the guiding hand of counsel is the sine qua non of 
reliability for purposes of subsequent enhancements is simply incorrect. An uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction is sufficiently reliable to support a sentence that includes no jail 
time. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). It is also 
sufficiently reliable to enhance a subsequent conviction, even if the enhancement increases 
prison time. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748. 
The fact that jail time was temporarily attached to such a conviction changes nothing. 
Shelton's conviction was neither more nor less reliable because the appellate court, rather 
than the trial court, determined that no suspended j ail time could be imposed. Once Shelton' s 
jail time was vacated, his remaining sentence and his underlying conviction were perfectly 
legal and reliable for all purposes, including enhancement of a subsequent offense. 
So here, had defendant received no jail time for his prior offense, his conviction 
would indisputably have been available to enhance the instant offense. The imposition of 
suspended jail time did not make that conviction any less reliable, or any less suitable for 
enhancement purposes, than if the suspended jail time had never been imposed. 
3 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT L 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION IS ENTITLED TO THE 
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, WHICH DEFENDANT DID 
NOT REBUT 
If this Court agrees with the State on the first issue, it need not reach the second. This 
is so because even if defendant's jail sentence was wrongly imposed, and thus subject to 
vacation, his underlying conviction, like Shelton's, remains valid for enhancement purposes. 
However, if this Court concludes that a prior uncounseled conviction involving jail 
time may not be used to enhance a subsequent charge unless the defendant duly waived his 
right to counsel, it must address two further questions. First, does defendant bear the burden 
of proving whether defendant waived his right to counsel? Second, if so, did he satisfy it? 
A. Defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
regularity even if the prior judgment shows he appeared pro se. 
Defendant claims that the presumption of regularity "does not attach when a 
conviction shows on its face that a defendant was not represented by counsel." Br. Aple. at 
8 (capitalization and italics omitted). Here, he argues, "the presumption of regularity never 
attached" to his prior conviction because "there is no indication from the record of conviction 
that he was advised or waived his right to counsel." Br. Aple. at 13. Therefore, he 
concludes, "the State had the burden of proving that Mr. Ferguson knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel." Br. Aple. at 9. 
The "presumption of regularity" is "deeply rooted in our jurisprudence." Parke v. 
Raley, 506 U.S. 20,29 (1992). Even a prior conviction that demonstrates on its face that the 
4 
defendant was unrepresented is entitled to this presumption. This is so because a defendant 
may waive his right to counsel. A contrary approach would, rather than respecting the 
presumption that courts "know and follow the law," presume that the trial court violated the 
law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2003) (rejecting federal habeas challenge to 
state conviction). 
Controlling case law does not distinguish between prior convictions in which the 
defendant was unrepresented and those in which the defendant waived counsel. State v. 
Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (1989), holds that a judgment of conviction "is entitled to a 
presumption of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant was represented by 
counsel. This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State may have of proving that the 
defendant had or knowingly wqived counsel." Id. at 149 (emphasis added). Defendant 
asserts the opposite: that despite the presumption of regularity, "the State had the burden of 
proving that Mr. Ferguson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel." Br. Aple. 
at 9. 
The presumption of regularity is not reversed by a notation on defendant's conviction 
that he appeared pro se. Defendant argues that, "Read together, Burgett[l] and Triptow[2] 
stand for the proposition that a presumption of regularity only attaches when there is nothing 
on the face of the conviction to indicate that a defendant was not represented by counsel." 
1
 Burgettv. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). 
2
 State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1989). 
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Br. Aple. at 11. On the contrary, Triptow makes clear that the court must presume, not that 
defendant was represented in the prior proceeding, but that "the right to counsel has been 
observed." 770 P.2d at 149. "This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State may 
have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived counsel." Id. Triptow thus 
explicitly relieves the State of any initial burden of proving that the defendant knowingly 
waived counsel. 
State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.3d 1035, underscores this conclusion. 
Defendant suggests that Gutierrez reiterates that the presumption of voluntariness applies 
only to counseled guilty pleas: "This Court reiterated that it is 'a plea entered with the benefit 
of counsel [that] is "presumed to have been voluntary"' . . . ." See Br. Aple. at 11, n.4. 
Gutierrez does state that "a plea entered with the benefit of counsel is 'presumed to have 
been voluntary5 absent evidence demonstrating lack of voluntariness." 2003 UT App 95, f^ 
8 (citation omitted). But Gutierrez involved two prior guilty pleas, one entered in 1994 and 
one in 1999. Id. at ^ f 5. It is apparent from the opinion that Gutierrez was represented in the 
1994 plea, but not in the 1999 plea. See Id. at ffl[ 6-9. Yet this Court applied the presumption 
of regularity to both. Id. at f^ 13. 
B. Defendant did not rebut the presumption of regularity. 
Defendant claims that "even if the Court determines that the burden shifted to Mr. 
Ferguson, he produced 'some evidence5 that he was unrepresented and did not knowingly 
waive counsel." Br. Aple. at 14. On the contrary, defendant produced no evidence. 
6 
When the State relies on a prior conviction to enhance a present offense, "the State 
bears the burden of proving the prior conviction..." Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. "A previous 
judgment of conviction so proven is entitled to a presumption of regularity, including a 
presumption that the defendant was represented by counsel. This presumption satisfies any 
initial burden the State may have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived 
counsel." Id The burden then shifts to defendant: "After proof of the previous conviction 
is introduced, the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence 
that he or she was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel." Id. 
This showing shifts the burden back to the State: "Once the defendant has presented some 
evidence, the presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden shifts to the State to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in fact represented or knowingly 
waived representation." Id. 
Gutierrez holds that a defendant's self-serving affidavit does not rise to the level of 
"some evidence." Gutierrez challenged a prior conviction based on a proceeding in which 
he apparently was unrepresented. He submitted an affidavit asserting that "the judge did not 
inform him of his right to counsel" and "that he was not offered the assistance of a public 
defender." 2003 UT App 95, \ 9. This Court held that, for reasons of precedent and policy, 
a defendant's self-serving affidavit is, by itself, "insufficient to invalidate a prior conviction." 
Id. at \ 10 (citations omitted). In addition, this Court stated that "a defendant seeking to rebut 
7 
the presumption of regularity must produce a transcript, testimony regarding taking of the 
plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative evidence." Id. at ^  11 (citations omitted). 
Here, defendant relies on the fact that the certified copy of the Judgment, Sentence 
and Commitment showed that defendant appeared pro se and "did not contain any notations 
or make reference to whether Mr. Ferguson was advised of or waived his right to counsel." 
Br. Aple. at 16. What defendant describes is not some evidence, but no evidence. Where the 
record does not indicate one way or the other whether defendant duly waived his right to 
counsel, the presumption of regularity prevails. To rule otherwise would be to presume that 
the court violated the law. 
Parke v. Raley supports recognizing the presumption of regularity. There, although 
the judgment did not indicate that Raley either had or waived counsel, the Supreme CourT 
found "no good reason to suspend the presumption of regularity," since that was not a case 
where "an extant transcript is suspiciously 'silent' on the question whether the defendant 
waived constitutional rights": "[e]vidently, no transcripts or other records of the earlier plea 
colloquies exist at all." Parke, 506 U.S. at 30. In other words, although a silent transcript 
is suspicious, a silent judgment—as here—is not. 
This rule supplanted the rule of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). In Burgett, 
the Court, seeing "no indication in the record" that the pro se Burgett had duly waived 
counsel, held that "[presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible." Id. 
at 112, 114-15. The Parke Court distinguished Burgett on the ground that at the time of 
8 
Burgett's plea, "state criminal defendants' federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet 
been recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the defendant had not waived a 
right he did not possess." Parke, 506 U.S. at 31. In contrast, at the time of Raley's plea, the 
Boykin requirements were well established, so it was reasonable to presume that Raley had 
waived those rights. Id. 
Parke controls the case at bar. When defendant first pled guilty, his right to counsel 
had been established by Shelton the previous year. Absent countervailing evidence, the plea 
court must be presumed to have obeyed Shelton, Defendant counters that, although 
Shelton had been decided the previous year, the prosecutor and trial judge in the instant case 
were apparently unaware of it. See Br. Aple. at 20-21. Yet the relevant inquiry is not 
whether the judge in the instant case was aware of Shelton, but whether the judge in the prior 
case was. Defendant offers no evidence that he was not. Nor does the record establish that 
courts generally were disregarding Shelton nearly a year after its issuance. 
Defendant cautions that reading Parke as the State does "would in effect create an 
irrebuttable presumption." Br. Aple. at 22. The Parke Court recognized that "serious 
practical difficulties will confront any party assigned an evidentiary burden in such 
circumstances." 506 U.S. at 31-32. Nevertheless, it assigned that burden to the party 
attacking a final conviction, observing that the government has no greater access to relevant 
evidence than the defendant. Id. at 32. If extrinsic evidence of waiver of counsel is generally 
unavailable or difficult to produce, placing the presumption may well decide the contest. 
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Thus, the practical and unacceptable effect of placing the burden upon the government, as 
defendant urges, would be to uproot the presumption of regularity and replace it with a 
presumption of irregularity. 
Finally, defendant contends that In re Smith, 925 P.2d 169 (Utah 1996), supports his 
claim that "a copy of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment explicitly stating Mr. 
Ferguson appeared pro se and the lack of any notation that he was advised of his right or 
waived it is enough to rebut the presumption of regularity on a prior conviction." Br. Aple. 
at 23. On the contrary, Smith demonstrates how far short of such a showing defendant falls. 
Numerous references to the record in the Smith opinion suggest that Smith had placed before 
the Supreme Court a complete record of the criminal trial at which he represented himself, 
including transcripts of motion hearings, scheduling conferences, and trial. See id. at 172-73. 
"[A] defendant seeking to rebut the presumption of regularity must produce a 
transcript, testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative 
evidence." Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ | 11. As noted above, Smith apparently produced 
a transcript. (Although the Smith court nevertheless concluded that "the prosecution met its 
burden of showing that Smith knowingly waived his right to counsel." Smith, 925 P.2d at 
173.) Defendant here has produced nothing—not even a "self-serving affidavit" of the type 
found wanting in Gutierrez. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ 12. Instead, he relies on a 
judgment silent on the decisive question of whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and 
voluntary. The presumption of regularity consequently remains unrebutted. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the trial court striking the enhancement to the charge of violation of a 
protective order should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
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